Why elections are unlikely to advance democratisation in Cameroon

Cameroon concluded its presidential elections in October 2025, with the incumbent, Paul Biya, securing yet another victory and extending his 43-year rule by another seven years. While the process complied with constitutional requirements and electoral laws, the outcome underscores a persistent reality : elections have repeatedly failed to advance democratisation in Cameroon.

To understand why, it is essential to clarify what I mean by democratisation, and to examine how political power asymmetries, escalating socio-economic inequalities and law interact to produce and sustain a political economy that systematically stifles democratisation.

What is democratisation ?
Issa Shivji, one of Africa’s foremost legal theorists draws a crucial distinction between democracy and democratisation “Democracy is a model. Democratisation is a process. Democracy is a transplant. Democratisation is organic. By democracy I mean the concept of bourgeois liberal democracy imposed by the West on the Rest. By democratisation I mean the struggles of the Rest against the West and its local ‘implants’ to expand the sphere of human freedom and dignity”.

My understanding of democracy—or more precisely, democratisation—aligns closely with Shivji’s view. It goes well beyond multiparty competition, electoral ritual, neat institutional arrangements, that is, what some commentators describe as “low-intensity democracy”. Instead, it draws on Archie Mafeje’s concept of “new democracy” : a substantive commitment to individual political equality, peoples’ right to internal self-determination (self-rule), popular sovereignty, socio-economic equity, and participatory parity in the shaping of political and socio-economic structures.1 Therefore, I use democratisation in its thick and transformative sense—one grounded in individual political equality and collective or popular self-rule, and oriented toward socio-economic emancipation.

With democratisation clarified, in what follows, I respectively explain how political power asymmetries, rising levels of socio-economic inequality, and law jointly obstruct democratisation in Cameroon.

Political power asymmetries
Democratisation, as presented above, is grounded in two core principles : individual political equality and collective or popular sovereignty. In practice, however, Cameroon diverges markedly from these ideals. The persistent allegations of marginalisation that have fuelled crises in the English-speaking regions, scholarly analysis of the deployment of political and institutional techniques to secure a Paul Biya-led “perpetual government”, and the ruling party’s uninterrupted record of electoral victories since its creation in 1985, together suggest the reality of a political landscape characterised by deep political power asymmetries that systematically privilege the incumbent and marginalise dissenting voices. This assessment is further reinforced by the 2008 constitutional amendment abolishing presidential term limits, and the chronic shortcomings of the country’s decentralisation process.

In theory, the decentralisation mechanisms proclaimed by the 1996 Constitution are intended to transfer power closer to the people ; in practice, political and fiscal constraints continue to hollow out this promise. The central government maintains tight control over decentralised authorities. Moreover, decentralised authorities remain heavily dependent on transfers from the central government, even though these allocations fall far short of the stated target of 15 per cent of the central government budget, amounting to just 4 per cent in 2023.2

The political power imbalances described above exist amid chronic poverty and widening socio-economic inequalities. This dynamic generates a self-reinforcing cycle in which political power asymmetries become entrenched, and sustained by widening socio-economic inequalities.

Escalating socio-economic inequalities
According to the World Bank (ibid., pp 7-19 & 35-46), poverty reduction efforts in Cameroon have stalled over the past two decades, while economic inequalities have continued to widen. The Bank estimates that approximately six in ten Cameroonians live below the national poverty line or remain economically vulnerable, pointing to a generalised condition of precarity. The Bank’s analysis also indicates that poverty and economic inequality increasingly coincide with socio-economic rights deprivations — e.g., persistently high unemployment, limited access to quality education and healthcare — as well as with constrained access to the basic infrastructure necessary for the effective enjoyment of human rights, notably electricity (World Bank, 2024).

Furthermore, expectations that Cameroon’s vast natural resource endowment would drive the country’s economic transformation remain unfulfilled, as a significant financial haemorrhage — including through capital flight and corruption — continues to undermine the country’s ability to realise its economic potential.

At the social level, inequalities are amplified by deep regional and identity-based cleavages. Poverty is disproportionately concentrated in specific regions, most notably the Extreme north and North regions destabilised by Boko Haram–related violence, and the English-speaking North-West region, which continues to bear the brunt of the protracted Anglophone crisis (World Bank 2024, p. 12). These spatial disparities are compounded by strong perceptions of ethnic bias in access to senior positions within the state apparatus, especially allegations of preferential treatment afforded to members of President Biya’s Beti-Bulu ethnic group. The cumulative effect is a growing sense of marginalisation among large segments of the population and an increasing fragmentation of Cameroonian society along regional and ethnic lines.

Such inequalities are not merely socio-economic conditions ; they are politically consequential. When large segments of the population are locked into daily survival, or consider themselves second-class citizens, their capacity to meaningfully exercise their human right to participate in the conduct of public affairs, including in the political economy— through, e.g., sustained political mobilisation, civic organisation, participation in the design of pre-distributive and redistributive policies, and electoral participation — is heavily constrained.3

Together, entrenched political power asymmetries and rising socio-economic inequalities produce a defining feature of the democratisation process in Cameroon : the systematic deference of law to political and socio-economic hierarchies.

Law, political power, socio-economic inequalities and the limits of democratisation in Cameroon
Theoretically, rules of international human rights law and domestic legal frameworks should constrain political power. In practice, however, law frequently serves power rather than limits it. While this is not unique to Cameroon, the Cameroonian case illustrates particularly clearly how legal frameworks operate within—and reinforce—existing power relations.

Cameroon’s laws, and judiciary have repeatedly been deployed as instruments of political consolidation. Judicial interpretations may adhere closely to the letter of the law, yet they often produce outcomes that entrench incumbency and marginalise transformative voices. Law, in this context, cannot be understood as a neutral public good ; rather, it is deeply shaped by, and in turn, structures the country’s political economy, precisely the political and socio-economic hierarchies described earlier.

The implication is not that law is irrelevant, but that its transformative potential depends heavily on the existing balance of political, economic and social power. Legal frameworks tend to reinforce the status quo unless they are pressured by popular mobilisation—by citizens, social movements and civil society. Absent such pressure, law itself, and electoral processes are often repurposed into mechanisms through which existing relations of domination are stabilised and reproduced, rather than as instruments for advancing democratisation (strengthening popular participation in the political economy, with the goal of improving livelihoods). In sum, democratisation is hardly advanced not because of bad law, but because political power asymmetries and high levels of socio-economic inequality precondition law’s operation.

Post-election demonstration in Douala, Cameroon. “The people are sovereign” reads the placard (Wiki Commons, 26 October 2025)
A path forward ?
For democratisation efforts in Cameroon to be strengthened, at least four interrelated conditions must be addressed :

Rebalancing political power asymmetries.
Democratisation requires an emphasis on individual political equality—understood as the equal consideration of all political voices—and a strong commitment to peoples’ right to internal self-determination. That is individual citizens and the population collectively, must be empowered and must empower themselves to control their political, economic, and socio-cultural destiny(ies) within the existing state system. Following the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, peoples’ right to self-determination allows for secession only with the consent of the state concerned.
Addressing economic inequalities.
Addressing socio-economic inequalities may be done through stronger popular agency in the design of predistributive and redistributive policies. Predistributive policies determine how the economy functions and who benefits most, thus structuring distribution ex-ante (e.g., financial regulation, corporate governance rules, labour rights and collective bargaining). Redistributive mechanisms, e.g. progressive taxation and social security, shape inequality ex-post by reallocating resources (or not) between different segments of society. Predistribution and redistribution often involve interests, exploitation and domination. Indeed, given that approximately six in ten Cameroonians are poor or economically vulnerable, strengthening social assistance programmes is essential. Yet, according to the World Bank, the proportion of Cameroonians receiving monetary or food support remains derisory relative to the prevalence of poverty and inequality.
Confronting allegations of social exclusion : regional and ethnic inequality. Decentralisation or federal arrangements could help address identity-based grievances and the belief among many communities—particularly in the Anglophone regions—that they are marginalised within the national project. Such reforms would strengthen popular agency in political and economic life, allow regions and groups to shape their own social and cultural priorities, and widen opportunities for women and young people to participate in public affairs. Fears that decentralisation or federalism would encourage secession in an ethnically and linguistically diverse society are understandable, but they misdiagnose the source of instability. States tend to fragment not because they share power, but because they refuse to do so. Where unity is maintained primarily through coercion or fear, the state remains fragile. By contrast, credible commitments to regional autonomy in emerging democracies have often strengthened trust, inclusion and participation.
Power makes law, not the other way around. Legal frameworks tend to consolidate existing political and socio-economic hierarchies. Where the balance of political power shifts in favour of individual political equality, collective or popular self-rule, egalitarian distribution of economic resources and social inclusion, law is more likely to serve emancipatory ends. As the adage goes, “revolutions are not made by laws”, and as Shivji adds “constitutions don’t make revolutions, revolutions make constitutions”. Put differently, political struggles shape law, rarely the reverse. More fundamentally, in contexts where the rule of power supplants the rule of law, legal frameworks and institutions — despite their transformative potential — are reduced to blunt and often ineffective instruments of change.
As might already be obvious, my point is to avoid the usual lapse into technocratic reformism. Absent the structural transformations outlined above, even though avenues for participation in the political economy are formally open, they will remain largely hollow, reinforcing political power asymmetries and socio-economic inequalities rather than advancing democratisation.

Some may argue that despite the constitutive role of law in fostering asymmetric political power relations and deep socio-economic inequalities, citizens can still vote en masse against the status quo and bring about change. Yet if such overwhelming support for change was indeed expressed at the ballot box, the persistence of incumbency can only be understood in light of the very conditions outlined above : entrenched political power asymmetries, deep socio-economic inequalities, and the constitutive role of law. It is these forces that ultimately neutralise democratisation efforts.

Conclusion
Cameroon’s October 12 elections are emblematic of a broader challenge across Africa : formal adherence to laws rarely translates into substantive advances in democratisation. As argued here, democratisation entails sharing political power, and reducing socio-economic inequalities, not merely periodic elections.

Scholars, analysts, policymakers, and citizens must therefore look beyond the ballot box towards the democratisation of politics, the economy and social structures. Democratising politics requires, at a minimum, the strengthening of individual political equality, and collective or popular sovereignty (self-rule). Democratising the economy points to a strong democratic control of economic policy and resources. Democratising social-and cultural structures, involves tackling the deficit of belonging.

Only when political and socio-economic imbalances are addressed will law begin to function as the neutral public good it is supposed to be, and will elections emerge as a vehicle for democratisation rather than the periodic ritual that often strengthens the status quo.

Finally, as Issa Shivji observes, “it is generally recognised that imperialist domination of Africa, from colonial to neocolonial forms, constitutes the main point of departure for understanding the conditions of the African masses. However, this domination is not seen as an external factor but is rather built-in the relations that obtain within the political economy of Africa… Therefore within each of our social formations there are those social groups and forces that provide the social basis for imperialism and these are what we call compradorial forces”4. Thus, while my post deliberately focuses on one side of the coin, that is, domestic dynamics, it does not preclude the possibility that external drivers or foreign interests may be implicated. This external dimension merits separate and focused analysis, which will be taken up in a subsequent piece.

Mafeje, A. (2002). Democratic governance and new democracy in Africa : Agenda for the future. Paper prepared for presentation at the African Forum for Envisioning Africa, Nairobi, Kenya, 26-29 April 2002. (see especially, pages 11-15). ↩︎
World Bank (2024) “Cameroun : Évaluation de la pauvreté 2024”, at page 148. Available at <https://documents1.worldbank.org/cu...> (accessed 16 December 2025). ↩︎
Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ; Article 13-1 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. ↩︎
Shivji, I. G. (2023). The Concept of Human Rights in Africa. (2nd ed., CODESRIA Books), at pages 93-94. ↩︎

The political power imbalances described above exist amid chronic poverty and widening socio-economic inequalities. This dynamic generates a self-reinforcing cycle in which political power asymmetries become entrenched, and sustained by widening socio-economic inequalities.